GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (Abridged)
By John Cicchitti Volume 30, Issue 2
One evening in 1982, a terrorist pulled into a New York City parking lot.1 Colm Murphy, an extremist associated with the Irish National Liberation Army (“INLA”),2 planned to acquire twenty M-16 automatic rifles.3 He was present in the United States illegally.4 While he had hoped to buy “SAM-7 missiles or ‘something that [had] the capability of taking down [a] helicopter’” for use in Northern Ireland, Murphy settled for the offered rifles and went to meet with the seller, ostensibly a member of the Italian-American Mafia.5 His contact—actually an undercover FBI agent—exchanged the weapons for Murphy’s money.6 Once the terrorist signed the final check and took possession of the weapons, federal agents arrested him.7
Federal prosecutors charged Murphy with “being an illegal alien who received and possessed guns.”8 A jury convicted, and he was sentenced to two years on that charge.9 On appeal, Murphy challenged his conviction, claiming the statute violated his Second Amendment rights, but the Second Circuit waved away this argument.10 The court reasoned, “in the absence of evidence showing that [a] firearm has ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,’ [the] Second Amendment does not guarantee [a] right to keep and bear such a weapon.”11 The Second Circuit upheld the statute banning illegal aliens from possessing firearms and affirmed Murphy’s conviction.12
A quarter century later, in District of Columbia v. Heller,13 the Supreme Court embraced a different Second Amendment theory.14 Instead of focusing on the relationship between militia membership and firearms, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment protected “an individual right to keep and bear arms.”15 Yet, “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”16 Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, courts have wrestled with the boundaries of the Heller-recognized individual right to keep and bear arms.17
The Second Amendment and Citizenship: Why “The People” Does Not Include Noncitizens
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (Abridged)
By John Cicchitti Volume 30, Issue 2
One evening in 1982, a terrorist pulled into a New York City parking lot.1 Colm Murphy, an extremist associated with the Irish National Liberation Army (“INLA”),2 planned to acquire twenty M-16 automatic rifles.3 He was present in the United States illegally.4 While he had hoped to buy “SAM-7 missiles or ‘something that [had] the capability of taking down [a] helicopter’” for use in Northern Ireland, Murphy settled for the offered rifles and went to meet with the seller, ostensibly a member of the Italian-American Mafia.5 His contact—actually an undercover FBI agent—exchanged the weapons for Murphy’s money.6 Once the terrorist signed the final check and took possession of the weapons, federal agents arrested him.7
Federal prosecutors charged Murphy with “being an illegal alien who received and possessed guns.”8 A jury convicted, and he was sentenced to two years on that charge.9 On appeal, Murphy challenged his conviction, claiming the statute violated his Second Amendment rights, but the Second Circuit waved away this argument.10 The court reasoned, “in the absence of evidence showing that [a] firearm has ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,’ [the] Second Amendment does not guarantee [a] right to keep and bear such a weapon.”11 The Second Circuit upheld the statute banning illegal aliens from possessing firearms and affirmed Murphy’s conviction.12
A quarter century later, in District of Columbia v. Heller,13 the Supreme Court embraced a different Second Amendment theory.14 Instead of focusing on the relationship between militia membership and firearms, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment protected “an individual right to keep and bear arms.”15 Yet, “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”16 Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, courts have wrestled with the boundaries of the Heller-recognized individual right to keep and bear arms.17